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Abstract
We test diﬀerent consumption theories using the German Reuniﬁcation “experi-
ment”. German reuniﬁcation was a large, unexpected income shock for East Germans,
and led to an exogenous variation in the gap that diﬀerent birth cohorts of East Ger-
mans experienced between their actual and optimal wealth holdings. This shock allows
us to test diﬀerent low frequency consumption theories without relying on the comove-
ment of consumption and income over the life cycle. In our empirical work, we derive
three stylized features concerning the saving behavior of East vs. West Germans: (i)
East Germans save more than West Germans after reuniﬁcation, (ii) this east-west gap
in saving rates is increasing in the age of the birth cohort, and (iii) for every cohort,
this gap is declining over time. In our theoretical work, we analyze which consumption
theories can reproduce these three stylized facts. We ﬁnd strong evidence in favor of
the precautionary savings model. We reject rule of thumb behavior, and ﬁnd only weak
evidence for habit formation.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
German reuniﬁcation was a large positive economic shock for East Germans. Natural ex-
periments of this scale have typically been missing for industrialized countries, except for
periods of war. We use the natural experiment of German reuniﬁcation to test diﬀerent
theories of low frequency consumption behavior within a life cycle setting.
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1The life cycle hypothesis, originally formulated by Modigliani and Brumberg in 1954,
is the dominant paradigm in economics for studying consumption and saving behavior.1
Under perfect foresight, the life cycle hypothesis implies that consumption changes should
be uncorrelated with expected income changes.
The comovement of consumption and income over the working life has been recognized
early on as a challenge for the life cycle hypothesis (Thurow, 1969). This comovement seems
to suggest that agents do not choose consumption rationally but rather act according to a
rule of thumb, consuming a constant fraction of their current income in every period of their
life. Yet, there exist several explanations for this phenomenon that are in line with rational
behavior, most importantly the presence of liquidity constraints, precautionary savings, or
changing demographics over the life cycle.2 Several studies conclude that these three factors
can cause the observed comovement of income and consumption over the working life (e.g.
Attanasio and Weber, 1995, and Attanasio et al., 1999, for demographics, Gourinchas and
Parker, 2002, for precautionary savings, and Gross and Souleles, 2002, for evidence of
liquidity constraints).3 Habit formation is another explanation for the coincidence of high
income growth rates and high saving rates (e.g. Carroll and Weil, 1994). It is diﬃcult to
come to a conclusion about the relative importance of diﬀerent theories in studies that are
solely based on the observed comovement phenomenon, since they potentially suﬀer from
omitted variable biases (Gourinchas and Parker, 2002). Browning and Crossley (2001, p.14)
conclude that “the issue is [...] which of several reasonable life-cycle models is the correct
one. [...] Richer data is needed to resolve the source of the consumption tracking of income
seen in the data.”
This paper exploits the natural “experiment” of German reuniﬁcation. Using the natural
experiment of German reuniﬁcation allows us to diﬀerentiate more clearly than studies based
on the comovement of consumption and income between rule of thumb behavior on the one
hand and optimizing behavior on the other hand. Moreover, we derive and test predictions
that arise uniquely under diﬀerent rational consumption theories. The candidate theories
are saving for retirement, precautionary saving, habit formation, consumption of durable
goods, and demographics. For East Germans, German reuniﬁcation signiﬁed a large shock
to labor and retirement incomes, as well as to wealth levels, and, as we show below, diﬀerent
theoretical models give unique predictions about the resulting saving behavior of diﬀerent
birth cohorts in the transition path of the East German economy to a new steady state.
The identiﬁcation of our estimates is driven by exogenous variations of the net present value
of the shock for people at diﬀerent stages of their life cycles. For example, reuniﬁcation had
diﬀerent economic implications for an East German who was born in 1970 and was at the
1There are varying deﬁnitions of the life cycle hypothesis. We use the term mainly to emphasize rational
behavior and a ﬁnite lifetime.
2Another possible explanation lies in the complementarity of consumption and labor (Heckman, 1974).
3Most of these studies do not test for rule of thumb behavior explicitly. An exception is the study
by Attanasio and Weber (1995). They formally reject rule of thumb behavior as an explanation for the
comovement, once they take shifts in family composition and labor supply into account.
2beginning of her life cycle in 1990, than for an East German who was born in 1930 and was
close to retirement age at the time of reuniﬁcation. We concentrate on the saving behavior
of the working population,4 and ﬁnd three stylized facts: (i) a positive gap in the saving
rates of East vs. West Germans, (ii) an increase of this East-West gap in the age of the birth
cohort, and (iii) a decrease of this gap over time for every cohort. Given the low explanatory
power of empirical studies of household saving behavior, it is particularly valuable that we
can base our analysis on a comparison of East Germans with a control group, namely West
Germans. If changes in unobserved variables inﬂuence the saving rate over time, we can
reasonably expect these to aﬀect both groups to the same extent. East Germany is the only
former communist country experiencing income shocks associated with the adaptation of
the market system in a very sudden way,5 and being provided with a control group, namely
the West Germans.
Natural experiments have frequently been employed to analyze high frequency behavior
of consumption, using quarterly, monthly or even daily data. Most of these studies focus
on relatively small income changes, and ﬁnd that, in contrast to the permanent income
hypothesis, consumption does react to predictable income changes.6 Notable exceptions to
this result are found in the studies of Browning and Collado (2001), Hsieh (2003), Paxson
(1992), and Souleles (2000), which analyze large income changes that the consumer faces
repeatedly over the life cycle. The welfare losses associated with setting consumption equal
to income in the respective experiments fall between 0.01% and 1.3% of annual consumption
for the studies that ﬁnd evidence against the life cycle hypothesis, while they fall in the
range of 2.1% to 7% for the studies that do not ﬁnd evidence against it.7 This suggests that
costs of reoptimization - psychological, monetary, or opportunity costs - might explain the
empirical results that are in apparent contradiction to the permanent income hypothesis.
Stephens (2003) ﬁnds evidence against the permanent income hypothesis in an experiment
exploiting a large income change, namely the receipt of social security checks. His study is
4For an analysis of the saving behavior of Germans during the retirement period, see Börsch-Supan et al.
(2001). Further, Börsch-Supan et al. (2000) give a description of saving behavior of West Germans before
and shortly after reuniﬁcation.
5The unions pressed for a rapid adjustment of East German wages and pensions to the West German
levels. This also seemed politically necessary, although economically doubtful, in order to prevent massive
migration from East to West Germany (Steiner and Puhani, 1997). For people from other Eastern European
countries, emigration possibilities were far more restrictive.
6See for example Johnson, Parker and Souleles (2004), Parker (1999), Shapiro and Slemrod (1995), Shea
(1995), Souleles (1999), Souleles (2002). Most of these studies ﬁnd no or only weak evidence for liquidity
constraints.
7We assume a time separable constant relative risk aversion utility function that is additive over monthly
consumption with a risk aversion factor of 2, and a discount factor and gross interest rate of unity (see
Browning and Crossley, 2001). These are the results of our calculations: Johnson, Parker and Souleles
(2004): 0.2%, Parker (1999): 0.6%, Shapiro and Slemrod (1995): 0.05%, Shea (1995): 0.01%, Souleles
(1999): 1.3%, Souleles (2002): 0.01%, Browning and Collado (2001): 7%, Hsieh (2003): 3.4%, and Souleles
(2000): 2.1%. We do not have enough information to calculate the utility loss for the study by Paxson
(1992).
3unique, however, in the sense that it analyses daily consumption. Natural experiments have
not yet been employed with regard to low frequency consumption behavior since experiments
of a scale large enough to inﬂuence annual consumption are typically missing.8 It is so far
also undecided whether the repetition of income changes is important in generating rational
behavior, which would suggest that consumersh a v et ol e a r nh o wt ob e h a v eo p t i m a l l y .N o t e
that the experiment analyzed in this paper, namely the exogenous shock of reuniﬁcation, is
diﬀerent from those used in the above cited papers, which exploit preannounced changes in
income.
In the next section we summarize the eﬀects of our experiment, i.e. the inﬂuence of
German reuniﬁcation on East Germans. After a brief description of the panel data set that
we use, we derive some stylized facts with a simple graphical analysis, and conﬁrm them
in a regression analysis. Then, we establish theoretical predictions for the saving behavior
of East Germans vs. West Germans from rule of thumb behavior and diﬀerent versions of
the life cycle model - incorporating retirement saving, precautionary saving, demographics,
habit formation, and durable goods purchases. The last section concludes.
2 German Reuniﬁcation
After the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, the events towards a political and
economic reuniﬁcation of East and West Germany proceeded at a fast speed. On the 1st of
July 1990, an economic and currency union was established, and on October 3, 1990, the
western and eastern parts of Germany were formally uniﬁed.
The East German currency was abolished on July 1, 1990. The exchange rate from
Mark (East) into Deutsche Mark was 1:1 for small amounts of accumulated wealth, and 2:1
for amounts of wealth above a certain threshold per person, depending on age.9 The less
favorable rate for larger amounts resulted in a loss of around one third of private savings.
Since net disposable income per capita and the price level in East Germany were lower
than in West Germany throughout the post-war era (e.g. net disposable income - using
a 1:1 exchange rate - amounted to only 45% of the West German level in 1989 (Sinn and
Sinn, 1991)), wealth levels of East Germans were on average considerably lower than those
of West Germans in 1990. Moreover, home ownership was less common in East Germany.
Private debt was exchanged at the rate 2:1, while pension rights and wage contracts were
transformed 1:1 (Sinn and Sinn, 1991).
Retirement payments have been calculated using the West German formula, but taking
8Levenson (1996) analyzes changes in social security provisions in Taiwan that were large enough to
potentially inﬂuence annual consumption. Using pseudo panel data, he ﬁnds no signiﬁcant change in con-
sumption on announcement of these changes. He provides several caveats for interpreting this result as
evidence against the permanent income hypothesis.
9East Germans less than 15 years old could exchange 2000 Mark (East) at the rate 1:1, while persons
between 15 and 60 years could exchange 4000 Mark (East), and persons older than 60 years 6000 Mark
(East) at this more favorable rate (Sinn and Sinn, 1991).
4East German wages as a reference point (Sinn and Sinn, 1991).10 The replacement ratio in
Germany is comparatively high and lies between 70 and 75%. Nierhaus (1997) calculates
that the real incomes of retired East households increased on average by 90% between 1989
and 1994, and concludes that in a comparison of real incomes retired East households are
the clear “winners” of German reuniﬁcation. In 1996, the average nominal income of retirees
in eastern Germany was 82% of the western German level. The average nominal pension
income per household in the East even exceeds the average pension income per household
in the West since 1995 (Sinn, 2002). This is mainly due to the higher female labor market
participation rate in the GDR than in the FRG. However, due to the lower age of labor
f o r c ee x i ti nE a s tG e r m a n ya f t e rr e u n i ﬁcation (see e.g. Börsch-Supan and Schmidt, 2001),
and due to the rapidly declining female employment rate (see e.g. Bonin and Euwals, 2002),
the social security wealth of an average working East German household at reuniﬁcation
should not be larger than that of a West German household.
Sinn (2002) reports that nominal income per household in the East rose from around
35% of the West level in the spring of 1990 (before the economic and currency union) to
above 80% in 1994. From 1996 on, it has stagnated at around 85% of the West level.
These income ﬁgures include transfers and social security payments. Employees’ compen-
sation rose to 76% of the West level in 1996, and only to 78% by 2001 (Arbeitsgemeinschaft
deutscher wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Forschungsinstitute, 2002). Table 11 in the appen-
dix reports the development of household incomes, pension household incomes, employee’s
compensation and inﬂation rates over the 1990s.
Since purchasing power comparisons are not available between eastern and western Ger-
many after reuniﬁcation, it is unclear whether the stagnant diﬀerence in nominal incomes
of around 15 percentage points in the second half of the 1990s corresponds to a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in real incomes. Sinn (2002) concludes that “given the somewhat lower price level
in the East, which primarily results from the low housing costs, this implies an average real
household income of at least 90% of the West”. The general perception seems to be that
further convergence of nominal incomes will not occur in the near future.
In addition to incomes, labor force participation rates and unemployment rates changed
dramatically over the 1990s in eastern Germany. Unemployment rates increased from oﬃ-
cially zero in the GDR to 18.8 percent in eastern Germany in 2000. The employed share
of the working-age population in eastern Germany declined from 83% in 1990 to 65.2% in
1999, while the western German share remained constant at 73% (Burda and Hunt, 2001).
2.1 Modeling German reuniﬁcation
In our baseline analyses, we assume that individuals from the former East Germany face the
same mean real income with the same risk as individuals from the former West Germany
after reuniﬁcation. As described above, real incomes might in fact not diﬀer much between
10As a result, on average the gap between Eastern and Western retirement payments corresponds to the
gap between Eastern and Western labor incomes.
5eastern and western Germany. Moreover, many people have migrated from eastern to
western Germany or have started commuting after reuniﬁcation.11 For each theoretical
model, we also discuss shortly the implications of three alternative income scenarios: ﬁrst,
a jump in real incomes to a level ρ<1 of West incomes at reuniﬁcation, second, a gradual
adjustment over the ﬁrst half of the 1990s, with real incomes corresponding to 90% of the
West level from the second half of the 1990s on,12 and third, the ratio of East to West
incomes being 90% for the youngest cohorts, and linearly falling to 70% for the oldest
cohorts, based on the graphical results in appendix B. Potential East-West income risk
diﬀerences do not matter for models assuming perfect foresight or certainty equivalence,
but will be considered in the precautionary savings model (see section 5.3).
For all models except habit formation, wealth levels at the time of reuniﬁcation are a
suﬃcient statistic for the diﬀerences between East and West Germans. As explained above,
wealth levels of East German households were typically lower than wealth levels of West
German households at reuniﬁcation due to the lower nominal incomes in the GDR, and due
to the unfavorable exchange rate formula applied to large wealth levels. We hence model the
impact of reuniﬁcation as causing an exogenous variation in initial wealth levels, endowing
East Germans with lower than the optimal wealth levels they would have acquired would
they have lived in West Germany from birth on.
In the absence of a better wealth measure, we use data on interest and dividend income
from ﬁnancial wealth from the German Socio-Economic Panel survey round of 1992 in order
to calibrate the theoretical models (see section 3 below for more information on the data).13
Because of small cell sizes, we build 5 year moving cohort means of this asset income,
separately for the East and the West sample, and construct an East-West ratio for each
cohort group. Since there is still a lot of noise in the data, we regress the resulting ratios on
al i n e a rt r e n d( ﬁgure 1 and table 1). The estimated East to West wealth ratio in 1992 is 0.21
for the oldest cohort group (born between 1928 and 1932), and 0.63 for the youngest cohort
group (born between 1968 and 1972). Hence, even for the youngest cohort the East-West
11Burda and Hunt (2001) report that from 1989 to 1999, 15% of the eastern German population migrated
to western Germany. Moreover, during the decade of the 1990s, the number of East-West commuters was
even higher than the number of migrants. Due to human capital diﬀerences, it might still be possible that
on average East Germans who work in West Germany face diﬀerent income processes than West Germans.
12For this scenario, we assume that the ratio of East incomes to West incomes evolves as shown in table
11 for the ﬁrst 6 years after reunifcation, that the ratio is 0.87 in the 7th year, and 0.9 from then on.
13The survey question for asset income asks: ”How high was the income received from interest, dividends
and proﬁts from these savings and securities in the last calendar year?” Some households give an exact
amount, while others just indicate one of ﬁve given ranges (less than 500 DM, 500 to 2000 DM, 2000 to
5000 DM, 5000 to 10000 DM, more than 10000 DM). For those indicating a range, we use the mean income
of households who actually give the exact amount within this range as a proxy. The question in the survey
round 1992 refers to income from ﬁnancial wealth in 1991. Information about income from ﬁnancial wealth
is suﬃcient for us if we can assume that East and West Germans held the same portfolio of ﬁnancial wealth,
resulting in the same interest rates earned on ﬁnancial wealth. Since stock holdings were not yet common
in Germany in the early 1990s, this assumption seems reasonable. Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2004)
give evidence that our chosen measure captures ﬁnancial wealth reasonably well.
6wealth ratio in 1992 is smaller than the average East-West income ratio over the 1990s.
O n ew o u l de x p e c tt h ew e a l t hd i ﬀerence to be larger for older cohorts, since they lived under
separate regimes for a longer time.14



























Figure 1: Actual and estimated east-west wealth ratios of diﬀerent cohorts in 1992
dependent variable:





Estimation of wealth ratios
Figure 2 shows the average ﬁnancial wealth holdings of East and West Germans in
1992.15 While in both parts of Germany wealth holdings are increasing in the age of the
cohort, the diﬀerence is clearly increasing in the age of the cohort.
14This calculation neglects real wealth holdings. If we include a measure of real wealth holding and regress
the new total wealth ratio on a linear trend, the constant is 0.1436 and the trend is 0.0098 (both highly
signiﬁcant). As expected, the wealth diﬀerences become larger for all birth cohorts if real wealth is included.
15An interest rate of 5% on ﬁnancial wealth is assumed in 1992.























Figure 2: Average ﬁnancial wealth holdings of East and West Germans in 1992 by cohort
3 The data
The data comes from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). This annual survey
was started in West Germany in 1984. From 1990 on, it covers also the territory of the
former German Democratic Republic. We use the survey rounds from 1992-2002 for the
initial graphical analysis, and the survey rounds 1992-2000 for the regression analysis.16
The question concerning ﬁnancial saving was only introduced in 1992. We use the original
sample established in 1984, and the subsample covering the territory of the former GDR
started in 1990.17
The saving data in the survey is recorded at the level of the household. Information
about personal characteristics that serve as controls, e.g. marital status, are taken from the
head of household. Because of our focus on labor force participants, we exclude households
whose head of household is retired, but include households whose head is unemployed. We
drop households whose head serves an apprenticeship. Further, we keep only households
16We additionally use the survey rounds 1990 and 1991 in the habit formation analysis. Due to German
data protection laws, researchers outside of Germany can only work with a 95% random sample of the full
Socio-Economic Panel data set. A detailed description of the survey can be found in SOEP Group (2001).
17We drop subsamples focusing on migrants, because foreigners might have diﬀerent savings motives.
Moreover, we do not use refreshment samples added in 1998 and 2000, because for these households we do
not have observations from earlier years.
8whose head is 65 years or younger at the time of the survey. The ﬁnal sample size consists
of 23,959 observations for the years 1992-2000, namely 14,874 in the West sample and 9,085
in the East sample.
The saving variable consists of positive ﬁnancial saving and amortization payments for
owner-occupied housing and other dwellings. This variable is left-censored for those who
report zero ﬁnancial saving. Details of the construction of this variable, and a comparison to
data provided by the German Central Bank, are given in appendix A. We build the saving
rate as the ratio of saving to net disposable household income. Both saving and income
are directly reported in the survey.18 The household is speciﬁcally asked to state monthly
net income including diﬀerent regular income sources. However, ﬁnancial income is not
mentioned as a subcomponent to be included into this measure. The question concerning
saving is asked immediately after the income question. It seems hence somewhat more likely
that respondents refer to disposable labor income and saving out of disposable labor income
instead of saving out of the sum of labor and capital income when answering the questions.
We therefore assume that the constructed saving rate captures saving out of labor income
(including transfers) over labor income (including transfers), both times excluding ﬁnancial
income. In our theoretical analysis, we will report predictions for the saving rate deﬁned the
same way, namely saving out of labor income divided by labor income. Sensitivity analyses
reveal that the qualitative results of the theoretical models would not change given a more
comprehensive income measure.
All real variables are adjusted to represent purchasing power in 2000. In accordance
with the residence in the observation year, inﬂation rates are taken from the CPI in eastern
or western Germany until the year 1999, and from a common CPI from 2000 on.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Graphical analysis
Figure 3 depicts the saving rate as provided by the Statistical Oﬃce over the period 1950 to
2001 (until 1990 only for West Germany; starting in 1991 the data includes the territory of
the former GDR). Until the mid 1970s, the saving rate in Germany was steadily increasing in
conjunction with the economic recovery after World War II. This is consistent with the life
cycle hypothesis, since Germany experienced dramatic growth during the post-war period.
From the mid 1970s to the beginning of the 1990s, there was a small decline in the rate
18The question about savings reads: ”Do you usually have an amount of money left over at the end of the
month that you can save for larger purchases, emergency expenses or to acquire wealth? If yes, how much?”.
The question regarding household income reads: ”If you take a look at the total income from all members
of the household: how high is the monthly household income today? Please state the net monthly income,
which means after deductions for taxes and social security. Please include regular income such as pensions,
housing allowance, child allowance, grants for higher education, support payments etc. If you do not know
the exact amount, please estimate the amount per month.”
9followed by an increase. From 1990 on, the rate steadily declined.


















































































Figure 3: Saving Rate in Germany, 1950-2001. Note: From 1950-1990 the graph shows the
saving rate for West Germany, after 1991 it includes East Germany.
In the GSOEP sample from 1992 to 2002, the saving rate of West Germans is largely
stable at around 12 percent (ﬁgure 4). The saving rate of East Germans is declining over
time, from almost 15 percent in 1992 to around 11 percent in 2002. The saving rates
converge in 1999, and from 2000 on the average saving rate of East Germans is slightly
smaller than the average saving rate of West Germans. Figure 5 depicts the average saving
ratio constructed from ﬁnancial saving only. The pattern is very similar, with a stable
saving ratio for West Germans, and a larger and declining saving ratio for East Germans.
Again, both saving rates become very close in 2000, and ﬁnally converge in 2002. Since
both graphs give evidence that convergence occurred in 2000, we concentrate the analysis
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Figure 5: Average ﬁnancial saving rate in West and East sample over time
Figure 6 shows how diﬀerent cohorts’ saving rates change with age in the East and
West samples, grouping cohorts of ﬁve adjacent birth years together. The saving rates are
generally higher in the East sample than in the West sample. Moreover, they tend to be
declining over time for every cohort in the East, while they are rather ﬂat over time in the
West. Looking at the East-West diﬀerences of the cohort age proﬁles (ﬁgure 7), one can
observe three features. First, the diﬀerences in the saving rates between East and West
Germans of a given age and cohort are mostly positive. Second, the East-West diﬀerence is
increasing in the age of the cohort. Last, the diﬀerence has a decreasing trend over time for
every cohort.19 The cohort results are very consistent with results from the Einkommens-
and Verbrauchsstichprobe (EVS), which is conducted every ﬁve years, covers around 60,000
households, and is considered to provide the most reliable measure of household wealth (see
appendix 15 for details).
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Figure 6: Cohort-age proﬁles of saving rate in West sample (left panel) and East sample
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Figure 7: Cohort age proﬁle of East-West diﬀerence of saving rate. Each solid line represents
ﬁve adjacent birth cohorts
124.2 Regression analysis
We investigate the statistical signiﬁcance of the three stylized saving rate features found
in the last section, and allow for various saving motives and relevant control variables in
a regression framework. Since the saving rate is left-censored, we estimate random-eﬀects
tobit models. We start from the following speciﬁcation:
Si,t
Yi,t
= eα · Y
β
i,t · eγZi,t · eδbirthyeari · ef(agei,t,θ) · eεi,t
which is, after taking logs and moving log(Yi,t) to the right hand side, equivalent to
log(Si,t)=α +( β +1 )l o g ( Yi,t)+γZi,t + δbirthyeari + f(agei,t,θ)+εi,t (1)
where S is saving and Y is disposable income. Disposable income is included as a control
to proxy for temporary income shocks, and to account for the fact that the rich have higher
saving rates (Carroll, 2000). Z is a vector of household characteristics including marital
status of the household head, the number of individuals above age 16 in the household, and
the number of children living in the household. The term f(agei,t,θ) is a cubic function in
age, to be able to account for the complex shape of saving over the life cycle. The omitted
marital status is single or widowed. Due to collinearity with year of birth and age, time
dummies cannot be included into the regression. To capture macro shocks, we instead
include the real interest rate on savings accounts. To take the logarithm of saving, we
assume saving is left-censored at 1 instead of zero, which makes the logarithm left-censored
at 0.
We create an East dummy that takes on the value 1 if the household lived in East
Germany before the reuniﬁcation, and create interactions of the dummy with all independent
variables. Let βEast,δEast, and θEast be the coeﬃcients on the respective interaction terms.
The following three hypotheses test the signiﬁcance of the three stylized facts that we
derived in the graphical analysis:
1. For a given income, saving of East Germans is higher than saving of West Germans:
βEast > 0.
2. The diﬀerence in the saving rates of East and West Germans is declining in the birth
year: δEast < 0.
3. The diﬀerence in the saving rates of East and West Germans is declining over the
course of the 1990s:
∂f(East∗agei,t,θEast)
∂age < 0.
An explanation seems in order for the test of the third prediction. Since we cannot
include time dummies due to collinearity, we use age to test this prediction. This test is
based on the assumption that life cycle eﬀects in saving, captured by age, do not diﬀer
13between East and West Germans. Given this assumption, the term f(agei,t,θ) captures the
life cycle eﬀect for every cohort of East and West Germans, and hence f(East∗agei,t,θEast)
captures the additional eﬀect of time for individuals from the East.
In our ﬁrst speciﬁcation, we do not include any control variables. In the second speci-
ﬁcation, we control for marital status, family composition, and macroeconomic shocks. In
the third speciﬁcation, the control variables are interacted with the East sample dummy as
well. Results are shown in table 2.
As expected, income has a very high explanatory power for saving. Moreover, saving of a
household is signiﬁcantly decreasing in the number of adults and the number of children in
the household. Divorced households save signiﬁcantly less than single or widowed house-
holds. Cohort and age variables have no explanatory power for the saving behavior of West
Germans.
The estimation results conﬁrm the three stylized facts. First, the coeﬃcient on the
interaction term of income and East sample is positive and signiﬁcant, indicating that the
saving rates of East Germans are higher than those of West Germans. Second, the coeﬃcient
on the interaction of cohort and East sample exhibits a signiﬁcant negative sign. This shows
that the diﬀerence in the saving rates of East and West is smaller the younger the cohort.
Last, the derivative of the cubic in age interacted with the East sample dummy with respect
to age is negative except for the very youngest (table 3). This validates that the diﬀerence
between the saving rates of East and West Germans is declining over time except for the
very young.
From the other interaction terms, only the coeﬃcients regarding family status are signif-
icant. East German households whose head is married or divorced save less than their West
German counterparts, relative to single and widowed households. The fact that most of the
other interaction terms with control variables are insigniﬁcant corroborates the assumption
that the economic environment after reuniﬁcation is not fundamentally diﬀerent for East
and West Germans.
14(i) (ii) (iii)
Dependent variable log(saving) log(saving) log(saving)
Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err.
income variable/interaction:
log(income) 3.287 0.072*** 3.444 0.079*** 3.383 0.081***
log(income)*eastsample 0.603 0.121*** 0.579 0.123*** 0.712 0.131***
cohort/age variables:
cohort (year of birth-1900) -0.013 0.009 0.007 0.033 0.004 0.040
age -0.121 0.162 0.090 0.169 0.003 0.173
age sq. 0.0001 0.0039 -0.003 0.004 -0.002 0.004
age cube (*10−3) 0.020 0.030 0.038 0.030 0.025 0.031
cohort/age interactions:
cohort*eastsample -0.140 0.015*** -0.140 0.015*** -0.137 0.068**
age*eastsample 0.240 0.281 0.311 0.278 0.516 0.296*
age squared*eastsample -0.009 0.007 -0.011 0.007* -0.015 0.007**
age cube*eastsample (*10−3) 0.071 0.051 0.093 0.051* 0.123 0.051**
other controls:
married -0.150 0.087* 0.073 0.105
divorced -1.035 0.116*** -0.851 0.139***
adults (age>16) -0.295 0.030*** -0.284 0.040***
children -0.272 0.031*** -0.241 0.037***
real interest rate 0.164 0.171 0.137 0.210






real interest rate*eastsample 0.073 0.361
eastsample 3.037 3.814 3.063 3.786 -0.738 7.768
obs 23,959 23,959 23,959
log likelihood -44,994 -44,872 -44,862
Notes: Std. errors with an * indicates that the estimate is signiﬁcant at 10% level, ** at 5% level,
*** at 1% level
Table 2:
Random eﬀects panel tobit estimation
15(i) (ii) (iii)
test of H0 : coeﬃcient p-value coeﬃcient p-value coeﬃcient p-value
∂f(East∗agei,t,θEast)
∂age (age = 20) = 0 -0.023 0.764 -0.024 0.755 0.045 0.662
∂f(East∗agei,t,θEast)
∂age (age = 30) = 0 -0.090 0.000 -0.108 0.000 -0.079 0.263
∂f(East∗agei,t,θEast)
∂age (age = 40) = 0 -0.115 0.000 -0.136 0.000 -0.130 0.058
∂f(East∗agei,t,θEast)
∂age (age = 50) = 0 -0.100 0.000 -0.109 0.000 -0.107 0.121
∂f(East∗agei,t,θEast)
∂age (age = 60) = 0 -0.036 0.357 -0.026 0.499 -0.009 0.904
Table 3:
Test of third prediction
5 Consumption Theories
This section turns to the main aim of this paper, namely testing diﬀerent consumption the-
ories based on the natural experiment of reuniﬁcation. We analyze which behavior diﬀerent
consumption theories would have predicted back in 1990 for the saving rate diﬀerences, and
then conclude which theories actually can explain the three stylized facts that we observe
in the data. If we ﬁnd evidence in favor of a speciﬁc theory, we conduct additional empir-
ical tests. We start with rule of thumb behavior, and then turn to four diﬀerent rational
consumption theories, namely retirement saving, precautionary saving, habit formation and
demographics. Last, we consider durable goods purchases. For each of the consumption the-
o r i e s ,t h es i m p l e s tp o s s i b l el i f ec y c l em o d e li s used. Since our aim is to analyze whether any
single theory is suﬃcient to explain the stylized facts, we do not build a more comprehensive
life cycle model that incorporates elements from diﬀerent theories.
5.1 Rule of thumb behavior
Motivated by the comovement of income and consumption over the working life, rule of
thumb consumers are most often assumed to consume a certain constant fraction of their
income in every period of their life. This form of rule of thumb behavior would imply that
East Germans do not react to their lower wealth levels, but just consume the same constant
fraction of their incomes as West Germans. We can clearly reject this form of rule of thumb
behavior based on the regression results. Of course, East Germans could consume according
to a diﬀerent rule of thumb than West Germans. Yet, as long as rule of thumb behavior
means that consumption decisions are solely based on current income, neglecting wealth,
risk, and income expectations, the cohort pattern and the declining diﬀerence between East
and West saving rates over time should not arise.
165.2 Retirement saving
In this subsection, we ask whether a model using saving for retirement as the sole saving
motive would have predicted the three stylized facts. Agents maximize lifetime utility
subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. They work up to period R and live up
to period T>R . Labor income Y and retirement income are both deterministic, with
retirement income amounting to a constant fraction α<1 of labor income. There is no
growth in the economy.20 The subjective discount factor β is equal to the inverse of the
constant gross interest rate, β = 1
1+r.
We model the impact of German reuniﬁcation as follows. West Germans live in the
described framework, starting life with zero assets. They accumulate wealth while working,
and drive down their assets while retired. Based on the estimated wealth ratios, we assume
that the wealth level of an East German household in 1990 amounts to a fraction κ(t) < 1
of a West German household of the same age, with t being the age of the household at
reuniﬁcation, and κ0 (t) < 0.
This model is able to replicate a positive saving rate gap that is increasing in the
age of the cohort, but since the saving rate for every household is constant over time,
the saving rate gap in this model does not decline over the course of the 1990s. The lower
wealth holdings at reuniﬁcation of an East German household that faces the same labor and
retirement income as a West German household of the same age induces the East household
to save more. Moreover, the East-West diﬀerence is larger for older cohorts, since the East
household has less time left to partially make up for the lower wealth through higher saving
while working, and because the relative wealth holdings of East households are smaller for
older cohorts.

















where t is the age of the household at reuniﬁcation, and At−1 is the wealth holding of the
West German household at the end of life cycle period t − 1. This term is unambiguously
positive as long as At−1 > 0, i.e. as long as the average West German household is not
borrowing. This point is crucial for our analysis: any economic model that predicts borrow-
ing and hence negative wealth holdings by young households fails to replicate the empirical
facts not only because on average we observe positive wealth holdings by young households
in the data, but also because under such a model young East Germans are better oﬀ than
West Germans, and hence should save less.21 Equation 2 also shows that the saving rate
20If growth is positive, agents should borrow while young and save in the later part of their working life.
Yet, data from many countries show that the young are not on average borrowing. Here, we simplify by
assuming zero income growth.
21While they received lower utility up to reuniﬁcation, under such model young East Germans have
lower debt levels and hence higher net worth than West Germans at reuniﬁcation (including the present
17gap is increasing in the age of the cohort t, as long as wealth holdings are not decreasing in
age during the working life, but that the gap is constant over time.22
We conclude that the retirement saving model cannot replicate the decrease in the
saving rate gap over time for any given cohort. Moreover, we have to rely on the unrealistic
assumption that income is not increasing over the working life to generate the other two
stylized facts. Last, note that 84% of West German households receive public pensions
as the only source of retirement income, and the average contribution of private pension
income to total retirement income amounts to only 3 percent (Börsch-Supan and Schmidt,
2001). Hence, private retirement saving plays a very small role in Germany. Life expectancy
has been sharply increasing for East Germans after reuniﬁcation, but it is still slightly lower
than life expectancy of West Germans, which makes the retirement saving motive potentially
weaker for East Germans.
5.2.1 Alternative income processes
In the ﬁrst alternative income scenario, East incomes jump immediately at reuniﬁcation to
a fraction of West incomes, YEast = ρYWest with ρ<1, and remain constant at this level.





















which is unambiguously positive as long as κ(t) < YEast
YWest = ρ, i.e. the East-West wealth
ratio is smaller than the East-West income ratio for every cohort. As laid out in section 2,
this was the case. None of the model predictions change using this income process. This
is also the case if we assume that the East-West income ratio is smaller for older cohorts,
since empirically it still holds that κ(t) <ρ(t) for every cohort.
If we assume a gradual adjustment process of East incomes to West incomes, some of
our predictions change. Especially, the gradual adjustment leads to a steeper income path
in East Germany than in West Germany, introducing a borrowing motive for East Germans
immediately after reuniﬁcation. Hence, the saving rate gap between East and West could
be negative, and the East-West saving rate gap would be increasing over time for these
cohorts.
discounted value of future income, which does not diﬀer for East and West Germans). If we had assumed a
rising income path under the retirement saving model, young West Germans might be borrowing, and the
saving rate gap between East and West would be negative for young cohorts. This problem arises again in
the habit formation model (see section 5.4).
22The gap is also constant over time if the consumption path is rising, since the diﬀerence between East
and West consumption within one cohort is constant. The retirement model can only generate a declining
gap over time for any given cohort if incomes are rising, i.e. the denominator of the saving rate gap is
increasing over time. Yet, this would lead to a borrowing motive for young West Germans, making the
saving rate gap negative for young cohorts.
185.3 Precautionary saving
In this section, we include income uncertainty into the life cycle model (see e.g. Carroll,
1992), and abstract from a retirement period. Each agent maximizes the discounted value







subject to the intertemporal budget constraint:
Xt+1 =( 1+r)(Xt − Ct)+Yt+1 (4)
and a borrowing constraint
Xt+1 ≥ 0 (5)
where Ct is consumption, and Xt is cash on hand at the beginning of the period.
Labor income follows the stochastic path






















where Pt is the permanent component of income, G is the gross growth rate of the permanent
component of income,  t is a transitory income shock, and µt is a permanent income shock.







where γ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion.
To solve the model numerically, we represent one year as a model period. We calibrate
σ2
  = σ2
µ =0 .01, r =0 .02, γ =3 , G =1 .02,a n dβ =( 1+0 .04)
−1 =0 .9615.L i f ec o n s i s t s
of 45 periods. After having solved the model, we simulate 1,000 life cycle paths, assuming
that all West German agents start life with zero wealth. We use the estimated East-West
wealth ratios for diﬀerent cohorts to determine the wealth of East German households at
reuniﬁcation.

























Figure 8: Results from the precautionary savings model: simulated average wealth over the
life cycle
5.3.1 Simulation results
We depict four cohorts constructed as averages from 1,000 life cycle paths each: one cohort
faces the whole life cycle under the economic circumstances described above, representing
West Germans. The other three cohorts are only entering this economic environment at a
certain point in their life cycle, namely at period 10, 20, or 30. These cohorts represent
East Germans born in 1960, 1950, or 1940. They are endowed with only 56%, 45% or 35%,
respectively, of the wealth of a West German of the same age in 1990.
The wealth holdings of the West Germans are increasing with age until period 38 (Figure
8). All three of the East German cohorts start with low wealth holdings, but approach the
wealth level of the West Germans over time. The older a cohort is at reuniﬁcation, the larger
is the initial diﬀerence between its wealth and the wealth of its West German counterpart.
The saving rate of the West German cohort is highest at the beginning of the life cycle
in order to rapidly build up a buﬀer stock. It is declining over the whole life cycle. The
East-West wealth diﬀerences translate into diﬀerences in the saving rates. Figure 9 depicts
the cohort-age proﬁle of the saving rate diﬀerences between East and West cohorts over the
time period 1990 to 2000, analogous to ﬁgure 7.23 First, note that for every cohort, East
23Since our empirical analysis focuses on the behavior of the working age population, we omit in this
20German saving rates are higher than West German saving rates over the whole decade.
Second, the diﬀerences between East and West German saving rates are larger for older
cohorts than for younger cohorts. Last, for every cohort the diﬀerence between East and
West Germans’ saving rates declines over time, while East Germans manage to build up
a reasonable buﬀer stock. The precautionary saving model is able to replicate all three
stylized facts found in the data.










































Figure 9: Results from precautionary savings model: Cohort-age proﬁle of East-West dif-
ference in saving rates
picture cohorts that are in the last periods of the life cycle, running down their assets.
215.3.2 Alternative income processes
As in the retirement saving model, if we assume that East incomes jumped immediately
to a level ρ<1 of West incomes, the results do not change as long as the ratio of East-
West wealth holdings at reuniﬁcation is smaller than the ratio of East-West incomes after
reuniﬁcation, i.e. as long as κ(t) <ρ(t) for every t. Simulations with the precautionary
saving model also show that, even if East incomes exhibit greater growth rates than West
incomes over the ﬁrst years of the 1990s, the three features still arise. The decline of the
saving rate gap over time occurs more slowly, and the initial gap is larger.
5.3.3 Risk diﬀerences
In this subsection, we investigate whether there are substantial diﬀerences in the income risk
of East and West Germans, and whether we can ﬁnd additional evidence for precautionary
behavior in our data. We also want to make sure that the three stylized facts in the data
do not arise solely due to higher labor risk in East Germany, even if wealth levels would be
the same in East and West Germany.
Unemployment rates in East Germany have been rising sharply after reuniﬁcation, and
since 1999 are double the size of unemployment rates in West Germany (note, however,
that these unemployment rates concern the current residence, not the residence before
reuniﬁcation). On the other hand, the wage distribution in the GDR was more compressed
than in West Germany before reuniﬁcation, and while wage dispersion in the East has been
rising after reuniﬁcation, it still has not reached the Western German level (OECD 2001).
Biewen (2000) uses the measure of disposable household income employed in this paper and
ﬁnds that, despite a rise since reuniﬁcation, inequlity remains substantially lower in the
East than in the West by 1996.
To test whether labor income risk diﬀerences drive the results, we include two income
risk measures in the regression, namely the time-series variance of individual income over
1992-2000, and the unemployment rates in eastern and western Germany (see tables 10
and 13 in the appendix for summary statistics). The variance of net disposable household
income is on average larger for West Germans than for East Germans in our sample.24,25
24The variance and the coeﬃcient of variation of the unpredictable component of income are also larger
on average for West Germans than for East Germans. Moreover, the regression results are very similar to
those presented in table 4 if we include the variance of the unpredictable component of income instead of
the variance of income in the regression. The predictable component of individual income is constructed
by regressing the logarithm of income on a cubic function of age, occupation, education, marital status,
family composition, and interaction terms with age and age squared, separately for East and West Germans.
The unpredictable component is the diﬀerence between actual income and the exponential of the predicted
logarithm of income.
25Note that the unemployment rate diﬀerences between East and West have rather increased over the
1990s, and the general perception is that the high unemployment rates in the East will persist for the near
future or even be exacerbated after the inclusion of Eastern European countries into the European Union.
Hence, the third stylized fact, namely the declining East-West saving rate gap over time, cannot easily be
22(i) (iii)
Dependent variable log(saving) log(saving)
Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err.
income variable:
log(income) 3.376 0.080*** 3.413 0.081***
log(income)*eastsample 0.739 0.132*** 0.683 0.133***
cohort/age variables:
cohort (year of birth-1900) -0.035 0.042 0.003 0.040
age -0.016 0.173 -0.002 0.173
age sq. -0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.004
age cube (*10−3) 0.029 0.031 0.026 0.031
cohort/age interactions:
cohort*eastsample -0.128 0.070** -0.141 0.068**
age*eastsample 0.498 0.297 0.509 0.297*
age squared*eastsample -0.015 0.007** -0.015 0.007**
age cube*eastsample (*10−3) 0.119 0.053** 0.121 0.053**
other controls:
married 0.067 0.105 0.083 0.104
divorced -0.852 0.139*** -0.805 0.140***
adults (age>16) -0.278 0.040*** -0.287 0.040***
children -0.238 0.037*** -0.240 0.037***
real interest rate -0.187 0.229 0.131 0.211
constant -18.235 4.753*** -22.688 4.595***
other interactions:
married*eastsample -0.721 0.190*** -0.770 0.189***
divorced*eastsample -0.595 0.251*** -0.688 0.249***
adults*eastsample -0.050 0.061 -0.038 0.061
children*eastsample -0.101 0.068 -0.098 0.068
real interest rate*eastsample 0.314 0.374 0.064 0.361
eastsample -2.928 7.938 -0.186 7.771
unemployment rate -0.077 0.022***
unemployment rate*eastsample 0.117 0.029***
variance of income (*10−7) -0.325 0.048***
variance of income*eastsample (*10−7) -0.095 0.267
obs 23,959 23,794
log likelihood -44,854 -44,532
Notes: Std. errors with an * indicates that the estimate is signiﬁcant at 10% level,
** at 5% level, *** at 1% level
Table 4:
Random eﬀects panel tobit estimation with income risk measures
23(i) (ii)
test of H0: coeﬃcient p-value coeﬃcient p-value
∂f(East∗agei,t,θEast)
∂age (age = 20) = 0 0.046 0.659 0.044 0.672
∂f(East∗agei,t,θEast)
∂age (age = 30) = 0 -0.073 0.321 -0.080 0.260
∂f(East∗agei,t,θEast)
∂age (age = 40) = 0 -0.120 0.090 -0.131 0.057
∂f(East∗agei,t,θEast)
∂age (age = 50) = 0 -0.097 0.171 -0.109 0.111
∂f(East∗agei,t,θEast)
∂age (age = 60) = 0 -0.002 0.977 -0.015 0.850
Table 5:
Test of third prediction with inome risk measures
The results for the interaction terms of interest do not change signiﬁcantly (tables 4 and
5). The coeﬃcient on the unemployment rate is negative and signiﬁcant, yet the interaction
term with the East sample dummy is positive and signiﬁcant. This shows that for East
Germans, higher unemployment rates are associated with higher saving. The results for the
variance of income are similar, although the interaction term is now insigniﬁcant instead of
positive. While the signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcients on income risk for the West sample are
hard to explain, note that wealth holdings of western households could be at their optimal
level, in which case income risk should not inﬂuence saving signiﬁcantly.
In addition to these empirical ﬁndings, we include risk diﬀerences in the theoretical
model. For this purpose, we estimate the variance of the permanent and temporary income
shock as suggested by Carroll and Samwick (1997). The procedure is described in appendix
D. The estimated variance of the temporary income shock is slightly larger in the East
German sample, while the estimated variance of the permanent income shock is smaller (see
table 6). Using the estimated variances in the calibration of the model leads to somewhat
larger East-West saving rate diﬀerences, with the largest initial diﬀerence for the older
cohorts amounting to around 6 percentage points. The other features of ﬁgure 9, namely




West sample 0.03766 0.01194
(0.00299) (0.00112)
East sample 0.03777 0.01175
(0.00259) (0.00097)
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis
Table 6: Estimated variances of the temporary and permanent income shock
explained by a precautionary saving motive caused solely by the higher unemployment risk.
26Results are available from the author upon request.
245.4 Habit formation





subject to the budget constraint
Ai =( 1+r)(Ai−1 + Yi − Ci)
with At−1 and Ct−1 given. The parameter λ represents the strength of the habit motive.
Assuming β = 1
1+r, we can solve the model analytically and get the following solution27:
Ci = αt
"





































Since the habit formation model involves a backward looking component, the wealth
levels of East Germans at reuniﬁcation are no longer a suﬃcient statistic for the shock of
reuniﬁcation. Instead, we additionally have to make assumptions about the consumption
levels of East Germans before reuniﬁcation. With habit formation, consumption depends on
past consumption, namely consumption one period lagged, Ci−1, and the initial “endowed”
consumption, Ct−1. Hence, consumption adjusts slowly to the new optimal level after the
increase in incomes associated with German reuniﬁcation. In the meantime, saving rates
are high and decreasing.
Since an easily interpretable equation of the diﬀerence in the saving rate between East
and West German birth cohorts cannot be derived from equation 7, we show results from two
simulations. In the ﬁrst simulation, we assume a relatively weak habit motive of λ =0 .1,
while in the second we assume a strong habit motive of λ =0 .9. Income is constant
over the life cycle,28 and East German cohorts are assigned with the estimated wealth
levels at reuniﬁcation. Endowed consumption levels for West Germans at the beginning
of the life cycle are set such that the saving rate in the ﬁrst period roughly corresponds
to the saving rate of young West Germans of around 10% that we observe in the data.
To achieve this, for the weak habit motive endowed West consumption equals Ct−1 =0 ,
27We follow the methodology developed by Alessie and Lusardi (1997) for the inﬁnite horizon case, denoting
C
∗
i = Ci − λCi−1, and solving for the optimal C
∗
i in a ﬁrst step.
28As in the retirement model, a growing income path would lead West agents to borrow at some point
during early life, unless the habit motive is implausibly large. Hence, this would make young East Germans
actually better oﬀ than young West Germans.
25while for the strong habit motive it equals Ct−1 =0 .9. For East Germans, we assume
that “endowed” consumption Ct−1 corresponds to the consumption level in the last period
before reuniﬁcation. We set East German pre-reuniﬁcation consumption equal to 75% of
the consumption of West Germans of the same age, since this corresponds to the gap that
we observe in the posession of durable goods in 1990 (see section 5.4.2). Figure 10 shows
the resulting diﬀerences between the saving rates of East and West cohorts for the four












































































































Figure 10: East-West diﬀerence in saving rates with weak and strong habit motive
The diﬀerence between the saving rates of East and West Germans is positive for all
cohorts in the ﬁrst years after reuniﬁcation, and declining over the course of the 1990s. For a
weak habit motive, the decline is very rapid, while for a strong motive it occurs more slowly.
Initial diﬀerences are increasing in the strength of the habit motive. Under both a weak and
a strong habit motive, there is no pattern in the saving rate gap for diﬀerent cohorts. Under
the current calibrations, the gap is virtually similar for all cohorts in the same year. In both
simulations, consumption for West Germans is relatively ﬂat except for the ﬁrst periods of
the life cycle. Since the consumption levels in the last period before reuniﬁcation play a
more important role than the wealth levels at reuniﬁcation in determining the saving rates,
the East saving rates immediately after reuniﬁcation are also quite similar for all cohorts.
This leads to similar saving rate gaps for diﬀerent cohorts.
We conduct diﬀerent sensitivity analyses with respect to the chosen parameter values.
Only very rare conﬁgurations can generate a cohort ordering as seen in the data. Two
crucial parameters are the strength of the habit motive, and the inital endowed consumption
of West Germans. Only with a strong habit motive and endowed West consumption of
zero is the model able to match all three stylized facts. However, in this case the cohort
26ordering arises because West German consumption increases very slowly over the life cycle,
resulting in implausibly high initial saving rates of up to 0.8. Moreover, a large habit motive
seems relatively implausible. For example, Dynan (2000) and Guariglia and Rossi (2002)
ﬁnd indeed no signiﬁcant evidence for any habit motive in a model similar to ours. We
conclude that the ability of the habit formation model to match the stylized facts of a
cohort ordering in the saving rate diﬀerences relies crucially on the strength of the habit
motive, in combination with low endowed consumption for West households.29
The habit model might fair better in matching the cohort ordering, if older East German
cohorts exhibit stronger habit than younger cohorts, because they lived under the socialist
system for a longer time period. However, in the empirical analysis in section 5.4.2, we do
not ﬁnd evidence for stronger habits among older East cohorts.
5.4.1 Alternative income processes
The results from the baseline calibration do not change if East incomes rise immediately and
permanently to a level 0.8 of West incomes. In the case of a strong habit, the inital saving
rate diﬀerentials become more realistic, but a reverse cohort pattern arises. If we model
gradual income adjustment over the ﬁrst years after reuniﬁcation, the initial saving rate
diﬀerences are negative, since East Germans borrow in the ﬁrst years after reuniﬁcation.
Last, assuming that the ratio of East to West incomes is larger for older cohorts also leads
to a reversed cohort pattern.
5.4.2 Additional habit evidence
The idea of habit formation is contradicted by the behavior of the saving rate right around
reuniﬁcation. Sinn and Sinn (1991) report the saving rate in eastern Germany in the last
quarter of 1989, and in 1990 (see ﬁgure 11). In the ﬁrst two quarters of 1990, when wages
and pensions were already rising sharply, but the currency union was not yet in place,
the saving rate rose from 12.7% in the fourth quarter of 1989 to 18.4% and 22.4% in the
ﬁrst and second quarter of 1990. In June of 1990, the saving rate peaked at 39.5%, and
plummeted immediately after the currency union to -9.3% in July and -9.7% in August.
In the fourth quarter of 1990, it was already back at 13.4%. This sharp movement of the
saving rate in 1990 could be explained by massive purchases of goods immediately after the
implementation of the currency union, in contrast to habit formation.
We do the following additional exercise in order to get some intuition whether habit for-
mation might play an important role in our data. In 1990, GSOEP asked East households
29We also conduct sensitivity analyses regarding the endowed consumption of East Germans. We assume
that East consumption in the last period before reuniﬁcation equals 45% of West consumption of the same
birth cohort, based on nominal income diﬀerences at reuniﬁcation, or rather the same cohort-speciﬁcp e r -
centage that we estimated for the wealth levels. The ﬁrst case does not result in any cohort pattern, while
in the second case a weak cohort pattern arises for the ﬁrst years after reuniﬁcation, and the cohort paths
cross later on.
27Saving rate of East German households around 





























Figure 11: Saving rate of East German households, from last quarter of 1989 to last quarter
of 1990.
about their relationships with households in West Germany. GSOEP provides informa-
tion whether a household had friends or relatives in West Germany, whether these West
Germans provided the household with presents, and the average yearly amount of presents
in Deutsche Mark. Given the same income process, households with better connection to
West households could potentially have achieved higher consumption levels through these
presents, and should hence save less than their counterparts after reuniﬁcation if habits are
important. 84% of the sampled households had friends or relatives in West Germany, and
23% regularly received gifts. The average yearly amount of gifts conditional on receiving a
gift was sizeable, namely 306 DM (around 150 USD).
Additionally, GSOEP provides data about certain durable consumption goods and hous-
ing conditions of East Germans in June 1990, i.e. one month before the introduction of the
economic and monetary union, and four month before reuniﬁcation. Most durable consump-
tion goods, i.e. cars and telephones, were rationed in the GDR, and were often available only
after long waiting periods or to persons favored by the government. Hence, even control-
ling for income, durable goods possession varied signiﬁcantly in the population. Generally,
because of the waiting periods, the older a household, the more likely was the possession
of durable goods. While it would be preferable to have information on nondurable goods
consumption to test for habit formation, under the strong assumption of the absence of
adjustment costs the following predictions can be made. Holding income changes constant,
households that had relatively high consumption levels experience smaller adjustments to
their new optimal consumption levels, and should hence save less than their counterparts
with lower initial consumption levels. To test this prediction, we include a dummy for car
ownership in 1990 and two indices into the regression. One index is constructed by counting
28and summing up possession of electronic goods in 1990. The second index counts possession
of equipment associated with housing.30 Habit formation would predict a negative coeﬃ-
cient on the interaction terms of both indices and the car ownership dummy with the East
sample.





washing machine 91.5 43.7




bath inside residence 98.8 91.4
hot water 99.2 95.2
toilet inside residence 98.7 87.6
modern heating system 91.7 65.1
Table 7:
Equipment of households with durable goods in 1990
Table 7 gives an overview of the equipment with durable goods in East and West Ger-
many in 1990.31 As one can see, the vast majority of households in West Germany was
well equipped with durable goods in 1990, while the percentage of East German households
equipped with the respective good was always lower, on average by 25 percentage points.
In the ﬁrst column of table 8, we include the yearly amount of received gifts in the
standard regression. This variable probably captures to a great extent nondurable goods.
In the second column, we include as well both indices for electronic goods and household
equipment, the car ownership dummy, and their interaction terms with the eastsample
(all referring to ownership in 1990).32 The sample size is reduced to 19,591, since not all
households provided information on all goods, and some households were built only after
1990.
30Both indices just sum the dummy variables for possession, not assigning weights to the diﬀerent goods.
The electronic goods in the index all have prices of a similar scale.
31For West Germany, the values are either from 1991 or 1992, since the 1990 survey did not ask the
relevant questions. It seems probable that the values did not change much over time.
32The usual controls and interaction terms are included, but not reported to save space. They did not
change signiﬁcantly.
29(i) (ii) (ii)
Dependent variable log(saving) log(saving) log(saving)
Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err.
income variable:
log(income) 3.248 0.089*** 3.132 0.091*** 3.248 0.089***
log(income)*eastsample 0.827 0.143*** 0.866 0.145*** 0.823 0.142***
cohort/age variables:
cohort (year of birth-1900) 0.002 0.042 0.008 0.043 0.005 0.042
age -0.259 0.196 -0.343 0.201 -0.155 0.204
age sq. 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.002 0.005
age cube (*10−3) -0.020 0.033 -0.032 0.034 -0.005 0.034
cohort/age interactions:
cohort*eastsample -0.143 0.069** -0.137 0.070** -0.142 0.069**
age*eastsample 0.741 0.329** 0.844 0.328*** 0.744 0.329**
age squared*eastsample -0.021 0.008*** -0.023 0.007*** -0.021 0.008***
age cube*eastsample(*10−3) 0.167 0.057*** 0.180 0.057*** 0.168 0.057***
usual controls yes yes yes
usual controls interactions yes yes yes
relations with frg
amount of gifts received (*10−3) 0.086 0.067 0.067 0.076 0.091 0.194
amount of gifts * middle age (*10−3) 0.053 0.201
amount of gifts * old age (*10−3) -0.049 0.215
age group dummies yes
equipment in 1990
car 1.149 0.173***
electronic goods -0.125 0.103
housing equipment 0.751 0.171***
equipment interactions
car*eastsample -0.299 0.238
electronic goods*eastsample 0.366 0.134***
housing equipment*eastsample -0.702 0.183***
obs 19,986 19,591 19,986
log likelihood -37,080 -36,290 -37,080
Notes: Std. errors with an * indicates that the estimate is signiﬁcant at 10% level, ** at 5% level,




test of H0 : coeﬃcient p-value coeﬃcient p-value coeﬃcient p-value
∂f(East∗agei,t,θEast)
∂age (age = 20) = 0 0.095 0.407 0.130 0.256 0.096 0.401
∂f(East∗agei,t,θEast)
∂age (age = 30) = 0 -0.077 0.299 -0.065 0.387 -0.077 0.304
∂f(East∗agei,t,θEast)
∂age (age = 40) = 0 -0.149 0.033 -0.151 0.031 -0.149 0.034
∂f(East∗agei,t,θEast)
∂age (age = 50) = 0 -0.121 0.082 -0.130 0.063 -0.120 0.085
∂f(East∗agei,t,θEast)
∂age (age = 60) = 0 0.008 0.923 0.000 0.999 0.010 0.898
Table 9:
Test of third prediction
The three predictions are still conﬁrmed in this estimation (see tables 8 and 9). Turning
to the variables of interest, we see that the coeﬃcient on amounts of gifts received from
friends and relatives in the FRG is not signiﬁcant. This estimate is not in line with the
theory of habit formation. This is probably the most exogenous measure of consumption
levels, since whether a household had friends or relatives in the FRG should have been
close to random in the East sample. Moreover, this measure best reﬂects non-durable
consumption levels. In order to test whether habits are stronger for older cohorts, we also
interact this variable with age group dummies, where "old age" refers to household heads
aged 50 to 65, and "middle age" refers to household heads aged 35 to 49. As column (iii)
shows, while the interaction term with old age is negative, the interaction term with middle
age is positive, and all interaction terms are insigniﬁcant. Thus, we do not ﬁnd any evidence
for stronger habits among older cohorts.33 Turning to the interaction terms in column (ii),
the coeﬃcient on electronic goods is positive and signiﬁcant, while the interaction terms
on housing equipment and car ownership are negative. The latter two results are in line
with habit formation, while the ﬁrst one runs against it. The negative coeﬃcient on the
interaction term with housing equipment is signiﬁc a n t ,w h i l et h en e g a t i v ec o e ﬃcient on
the car interaction term is not signiﬁcant (p-value 0.21). However, the caveat applies that
housing is associated with the largest adjustment costs and hence least suited to test for
habits.
From the theoretical model, we concluded that only a strong habit model can generate
all three stylized facts. The evidence towards habit formation from our empirical tests
remains inconclusive, and at best very weak.
5.5 Demographics
The changing family composition over the working life, especially the presence of children in
the household, changes the optimal household consumption pattern over time. As Attanasio
33This result also holds if we interact the amount of gifts received directly with age.
31and Weber (1995) show, the logarithm of family size exhibits a pronounced hump-shape
o v e rt h el i f ec y c l e . T h e ya l s oﬁnd that, after controlling for demographics, consumption
change does not react to income changes, in line with the certainty equivalence model. In
the empirical estimates, we control for the number of adults and the number of children in
the household (see table 2). Although the inclusion of the controls weakens the signiﬁcance
of the cohort pattern as well as the declining trend in the saving rate diﬀerence over time,
they still arise signiﬁcantly.
5.6 Durable goods purchases
Temporarily higher saving rates by East Germans might be due to durable goods purchases.
The consumption ﬂow from durable goods could only be raised by increasing the stock of
durable goods. If households are credit constraint and the wealth levels are not high enough,
they might have to save temporarily for durable goods expenditure.
While this line of argument might explain the two stylized facts of higher and declining
relative saving rates of East Germans, it is less clear why the cohort pattern should arise
based on this argument. Higher relative saving rates of older cohorts could be caused either
by a higher new optimal stock of durable goods for older cohorts, by a lower endowed stock
of durable goods for older cohorts, or by more stringent credit constraints for older cohorts.
The ﬁrst argument is not valid in a life cycle setting. Due to the higher wealth levels for
younger households, and given the same permanent income, the optimal consumption level
is higher for younger cohorts than for older cohorts. The second argument is improbable
given typical increasing life cycle consumption paths, and it is especially improbable in the
context of the GDR because of the long waiting periods often associated with purchases of
durable goods. More stringent credit constraints for older cohorts are also not likely, since
older East cohorts do not on average possess less wealth than younger East cohorts, and
more stringent credit constraints should arise due to less collateral.
5.7 Other diﬀerences between East and West
Other diﬀerences between East and West Germans might have the eﬀect that life cycle
proﬁles are diﬀerent in these two samples, hence invalidating the test of our third prediction
in section 4.2. These could be diﬀerences in risk aversion or in the discount factor. It is
diﬃcult to argue whether risk aversion and discount factors were inﬂuenced by the diﬀerent
environments East and West Germans lived in for 40 years. Higher patience or higher risk
aversion in the East sample could explain why the saving rates are generally higher in the
East than in the West. However, both parameters should not necessarily give rise to a
cohort saving pattern, neither to a decline in the East-West saving gap over time.
326C o n c l u s i o n
The natural experiment of German reuniﬁcation allows us to discriminate between diﬀerent
consumption theories that can potentially explain the puzzle of consumption and income
comovement over the life cycle by analyzing the saving behavior of East Germans relative
to West Germans after the large economic shock of German reuniﬁcation. We observe three
stylized facts of the saving rate gap between East and West Germans. First, East Germans
save more than West Germans over the decade of the 1990s. Second, this positive diﬀerence
is larger the older the cohort. Third, for each cohort, the diﬀerence is declining over time.
The strength of our test lies in the simultaneous presence of the three stylized facts. First,
we notice that the precautionary saving model is robustly able to generate the three stylized
facts. It is the only saving motive that is suﬃcient in isolation to qualitatively replicate the
stylized features of the saving rate. Second, we can clearly reject rule of thumb behavior
in our sample. Third, we do not ﬁnd evidence that changes in the family composition over
the life cycle cause the stylized facts. Last, we ﬁnd only very weak evidence in favor of a
habit formation model.
Some earlier studies using natural experiments and higher frequency data found evidence
against rational consumption and saving behavior. We believe that this study comes to
diﬀerent conclusions due to the immense size of the shock, easily comprising several annual
incomes for most East Germans. Reoptimization after reuniﬁcation became necessary even
if transaction costs, whether psychological or monetary, might have been large.
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37Appendix
A Construction of saving rate
A.1 Financial saving
Positive ﬁnancial saving is identiﬁed by a direct question regarding this item. We cross-
checked the saving rate of positive ﬁnancial saving over disposable income with the average
saving rate given by the Bundesbank, and both are very similar (see ﬁgure 12). Hence,
we are conﬁdent that this measure consists of deposits into bank accounts of various kinds
(including building societies), and purchase of stocks and bonds, similar to the deﬁnition of
the Bundesbank. Correspondingly, negative ﬁnancial saving would be deﬁned as withdrawal
from bank accounts, and sales of bonds and stocks. Yet, we do not have this information, and
accordingly our saving measure is left-censored for those who report zero ﬁnancial saving.
Last, ﬁnancial saving should also comprise amortization of, minus take-up of, consumer
loans. Questions about consumer loans were only added in 1997 to the survey, and they
do not indicate the date and amount of a take-up, but only the sum of amortization and
interest payments. Hence, we have to omit this category.34
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Figure 12: Average saving rate of German households, as provided by the Central Bank
and constructed from our GSOEP sample.
34A certain fraction of these consumer loans is probably used to ﬁnance the purchase of durable household
goods, and is paid back in the course of less than a year. For these loans, take-up and amortization fall
into the same year, and hence overall saving associated with these loans is correctly set to zero. Moreover,
consumer loans play a relatively small role in Germany. The average stock of houshold consumer debt
amounted to 2533 DM in 1998 (Münnich, 2001).
38A.2 Real saving
Real positive saving consists of purchase of real estate and amortization of mortgages, while
negative real saving comprises sale of real estate and take-up of a mortgage. We do not have
information about sales prices of housing. This is not problematic under the assumption
that the amount acquired by the sale of real estate ﬂows into ﬁnancial saving or new real
saving rather than consumption, thereby leaving the sum of saving at zero. Moreover, since
the purchase of a house must be ﬁnanced by ﬁnancial dissaving and/or the take-up of a
mortgage, the sum of these three saving measures also results in zero saving. Hence, in
net the amortization of mortgage is the real saving measure we are interested in. We also
assume that expenditure in upkeep and improvement of housing equals the depreciation of
the house, and hence both categories of real saving sum to zero.35
To calculate the monthly amortization of a mortgage from the sum of interest and amor-
tization payments, we make the following four assumptions. First, the borrower pays back
the mortgage in constant annuity amounts. Second, the overall duration of the mortgage is
30 years, which is the average duration of mortgages in Germany (Eurohyp, 2002). Third,
the interest rate on the mortgage is equal the average interest rate on 10 year ﬁxed mort-
gages during the period 1971 to 2001, namely 8.25% (Rheinische Hypo Frankfurt, 2002).
Fourth, interest accrues yearly. From these four assumptions, we can calculate the per-
centage of observed annuity payments that is due to amortization, depending on the time
elapsed since taking on the mortgage. At the beginning of the mortgage, amortization ac-
counts for a very small part of the annuity payment, while at the end almost all the annuity
payment constitutes amortization. We assume that the start year of the mortgage is the
year in which the owner moved into the house. If a household indicates that it purchased
the house it was previously renting, we take the year of the purchase as the year the mort-
gage was taken up. For those individuals who report in a survey year that they became
owner of the house they had already lived in before, we assume that the mortgage starts in
the respective survey year. Given the year of the mortgage and the schedule of interest to
amortization ratios, we can calculate the monthly amortization in Deutsche Mark from the
reported amount of the annuity. Only this amortization amount is counted as real saving.
For those cases in which the calculated start date of the mortgage is more than 30 years
ago, we proceed as follows. If the maximum year of mortgage in the survey years is bigger
than 40, we assume that the calculation of the start date of the mortgage was wrong. For
these payments, we proceed as described below for amortization payments for properties
that are not owner occupied. If the maximum year is smaller than 40, we assume that we
have the right start date, and that all payments in years of mortgage bigger than 30 consist
entirely of amortization, since in fact the interest amount is probably very small.
The survey also reports interest and amortization payments for properties that are not
owner occupied. Unfortunately, it gives no hint as to when these properties were acquired,
35There is one more form of real saving that we regard as minor in the German context and have to omit
due to lack of data, namely the purchase, minus sale, of gold and jewelry.
39and hence we cannot determine the start year of the mortgage. We therefore just assume
that the ratio of interest to amortization in the annuity payment is equal to the median
ratio of owner-occupied housing.
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Figure 13: Cohort-age proﬁles of income in West sample (left panel) and East sample (right
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Figure 14: Cohort age proﬁle of East-West ratio of income. Each solid line represents ﬁve
adjacent birth cohorts
Figures 13 and 14 analyse cohort-age proﬁles of nominal net disposable household income
for East and West Germans from 1992 to 2000.36 West German nominal incomes were higher
than East German nominal incomes over the observation period. Focusing on the ratios,
one can see that they are rather ﬂat or only slightly increasing over time for any given
cohort. The ratio tends to be smaller for older cohorts, i.e. the income diﬀerences are larger
for older cohorts. This motivates the third alternative income scenario, in which the ratio
of East-West incomes is .9 for the youngest cohorts, and falls linearly to .7 for the oldest
cohorts.
36The incomes are inﬂated to year 2000 values using diﬀerent inﬂation rates for East and West up to 1999.
41C Results from the Income- and Expenditure Survey
The Einkommens- and Verbrauchsstichprobe (EVS) is a cross-sectional household survey
conducted every ﬁve years, covers around 60,000 households, and is considered to provide the
most reliable measure of household wealth. Unfortunately, due to data access restrictions for
researchers outside Germany we cannot work directly with the EVS, but rely on summary
statistics reported in Münnich (2001). Figure 15 shows the change in ﬁnancial wealth
holdings of eastern and western German households for three diﬀerent cohort groups, namely
young, middle, and old, focusing on a similar cohort composition as we use in ﬁgures 6 and
7 (hence, the "old" are comprised by households up to age 55).37 From 1993 to 1998, young
households in East and West Germany accumulate on average the same amount of wealth,
while the middle aged East households accumulate more wealth than West households, and
the diﬀerence is largest for the old. This should translate into saving rate diﬀerences in
the years in between that are positive and increasing in the age of the cohort, as found in
GSOEP.














Figure 15: Change in average wealth holdings between 1993 and 1998 by cohort group from
EVS
37Since the summary statistics are reported by age, not cohort, the cohort composition changes slightly
over time: the young comprise household heads born between 1958 and 1968 in 1993, and between 1963 and
1973 in 1998. Similarly, the middle aged are cohorts born between 1948 and 1958 in 1993, and between 1953
and 1963 in 1998, while the old are born between 1938 and 1948 in 1993, and between 1943 and 1953 in
1998. In the EVS, East and West refers to current residence, not residence before the reuniﬁcation.
42D Risk estimation
Following the procedure described in Carroll and Samwick (1997), remove the predictable
income growth component g to get the following model in logarithms: yt = pt + εt and
pt = pt−1 + µt.
It is easy to show that Va r(yt+d − yt)=dσ2
µ+2σ2
ε,s i n c eyt+d−yt = µt+1+µt+2+...+
µt+d+εt+d−εt. Construct the unbiased estimate vid of Va r(yi,t+d − yi,t) for household i as
vid =( yi,t+d − yi,t)
2. This holds since, after removing the predictable component of income
growth g, E (yi,t+d)=yi,t.
To identify σ2
µ and σ2
ε separately, construct vid for all households i and all distances
d>2. σ2
µ and σ2
ε are the resulting coeﬃcients in the regression vi,d = dσ2
µ +2 σ2
ε + ui,d.B y
focusing on d>2, the estimates will be consistent in the presence of serial correlation of
the order MA(2) in εt.
E Summary statistics
Variable West sample East sample
Obs. Mean / Std. Dev. Obs. Mean / Std. Dev.
Per cent Per cent
saving rate 14,874 0.118 0.116 9,085 0.132 0.137
income 14,874 4,908 2,451 9,085 3,957 1,755
age 14,874 42.2 9.8 9,085 42.4 9.2
children 14,874 0.91 1.01 9,085 0.87 0.92
adults (age>16) 14,874 2.19 1.01 9,085 2.40 1.04
sex (male=1) 14,874 72.8 % 9,085 54.1 %
married 14,874 65.5 % 9,085 72.9 %
divorced 14,874 14.3 % 9,085 13.6 %
std. dev. individual income 14,762 963 866 9,032 811 577
Note: monetary values are in DM, inﬂated to 2000 values (1 DM approx. 0.5 Dollar)
Table 10: summary statistics
43nominal employees’ nominal household nominal pension inﬂation rates
compensation incomes household incomes (CPI)
East/West East/West East/West East/West
1991 0.493 0.57 0.74 n.a.
1992 0.619 0.68 0.83 2.61
1993 0.692 0.76 0.92 2.41
1994 0.726 0.81 0.98 1.34
1995 0.752 0.83 1.03 1.12
1996 0.758 0.85 1.08 1.27
1997 0.761 0.85 1.09 1.20
1998 0.763 0.85 1.10 1.14
1999 0.773 0.85 1.12 0.62
2000 0.775 n.a. n.a. n.a.
2001 0.776 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Arbeitsgemeinschaft deutscher wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Forschungsinstitute
e. V. (2002), Federal Statistical Oﬃce, Sinn (2002), ifo Wirtschaftskonjunktur, 7/1999
Note: Values for nominal pension household incomes are taken from ﬁgure 1
in Sinn (2002) and are approximate. The federal statistical oﬃce stopped
reporting CPI separately for East and West in 2000.
Table 11: East-West ratios of incomes and inﬂation rates, 1991-2001
44hourly gross wage disposable income p.c.




















Source: Arbeitskreis VGR (2002) and Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft (1999, 2000)
Table 12: Wages and disposable income, by federal state
Unemployment rates (in %)












Source: Federal Statistical Oﬃce
Table 13: Unemployment rates in eastern and western Germany, 1992-2002
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